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Exactly ten years ago, microfinance was awarded the Nobel prize, promising to “put pov-
erty in museums.” Today its legacy is quite different: 10 million defaulters in India alone.
The experience of microfinance in South Asia—the frontier of the industry glob-
ally—presents a puzzle.1 For over three decades, led by the Grameen Bank and 
BRAC,2 microfinance achieved, in its native Bangladesh, what few institutional 
experiments in rural and small scale lending had in the region before: repayment rates 
in the range of 90 percent across a borrower base of close to 25 million. Moreover, 
these rates remained resilient in the face of floods and a range of other crises, largely 
without deploying the coercive methods used by traditional moneylenders.3 Its subse-
quent importation into neighboring India, however—especially in the wake of the 
mutations introduced by SKS Microfinance4—quickly resulted in breakdown in the 
form of mass default. How can this contrast—the success of one and failure of the 
other in these geographically contiguous regions—be accounted for? And what does 
this tell us about the microfinance model?
In this article, we trace the roots of the crisis in Indian microfinance that started in 
November 2010, making international headlines, by analyzing the reasons behind the 
differential performance of paradigmatic instances of Indian and Bangladeshi microfi-
nance (i.e., the Grameen Bank and SKS Microfinance).5 In particular, we argue that the 
crisis was predictable given that the SKS version was premised on a misinterpretation 
of the model that had come to be standard in economic theory, namely, that the logic of 
its Bangladeshi predecessor was based on a purely “economic,” rather than a primarily 
“social,” calculus—and that, as a result, even its rapid replication was trivial.
Although the crisis in Indian microfinance was, ultimately, the product of a complex 
range of factors and broader developments in the industry (not least the interlinked 
phenomena of “irrational exuberance” and “overlapping,” and the advent of for-profit 
lending), its magnitude helps, we believe, to shed light on a longstanding controversy 
in the theory of microfinance: what attributes of microfinance are essential to its suc-
cess? Our analysis lends support to the idea that the key factor sustaining its achieve-
ments is what is described as “social capital” (a concept borrowed from sociology, 
originally coined by Coleman in 1988—now popular among economists),6 and “trust,” 
or merely reciprocity—a hypothesis put forward by us in 2008 and 2013.7 In particular, 
we argue that the Indian crisis is not just a symptom of the “growth pangs” of the indus-
try—an inevitable result of tensions confronted by an essentially localized institution 
attempting to develop into a universal model, or the “boom-bust” cycles endemic to 
credit markets. Rather, we assert that the failure arises from the fact that the SKS itera-
tion strayed from what lay at the core of the original model of microfinance.
A Brief History of Microfinance
The forty-year history of microfinance can broadly be divided into three phases, or 
“generations”—the first generation runs from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the 
second from the late 1980s to around 2006, and the third from the mid-2000s to the 
present. The critical shift is from the “Grameen model” of microfinance, archetypal in 
the first and second generations, to the “SKS model” that became increasingly domi-
nant in the third.
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The Boutique Moment: “Bicycle Bankers and Basket Weavers” in 
Bangladesh
Microfinance began as a series of small-scale lending experiments in the villages of 
Bangladesh in the 1970s—associated in particular with the Grameen Bank,8 but also 
with other major Bangladeshi microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as BRAC and 
ASA.9 As mythologized, this was the era of “bicycle bankers and basket weavers”—
marked by a small group of novice bankers (economics professor and Grameen founder, 
Muhammed Yunus, and his students) trying a social experiment on a category of people 
deemed ineligible for credit by formal lenders—women involved in a variety of “cot-
tage” industries, who needed loans for their raw materials. The surprisingly positive 
results of this experiment, especially in terms of repayment rates, paved the way for the 
microfinance model.10 The initial impetus for microfinance was to provide respite from 
the oppressive regime of traditional moneylenders—the only source of credit available 
to the demographic being targeted by MFIs—viewed as exploitative of poor borrowers, 
and often charging usurious interest rates. The reluctance on the part of villagers to deal 
with traditional moneylenders reduced the circulation of credit with adverse impacts on 
the rural economy—reducing productive investments and livelihoods.11
In its original vision, microfinance entailed providing small loans for productive 
purposes. The core of microfinance was “the group”: borrowers at most MFIs were 
organized into clumps of five to ten members. In theory, at least, lending was based on 
joint liability—or the idea that a second member of the group could not get a loan until 
the first paid back, thereby creating an incentive for “peer monitoring” (as first 
described by Stiglitz in 1990). Groups have served a crucial social purpose in the func-
tioning of microfinance as an institution, and it has been a subject of extended aca-
demic debate what precisely their economic function is. We will return to these issues 
in the following sections.
Whatever lay at the heart of the success of the incipient institutional experiment, 
there were several remarkable features of microfinance in its early years. First, as we 
have already mentioned, the repayment rates were extraordinarily high—in the vicin-
ity of 98 percent.12 Second, these rates were achieved despite a credit contract that was 
almost entirely informal in nature—characterized by the absence of either collateral or 
any formal contract between the MFI and the borrower. These accomplishments are 
particularly impressive in the context of a region where repayment rates on loans to the 
rural and agricultural sectors have, historically, been extremely low—and attempts at 
institutional formalization have not typically met with great success.13 Third, MFIs 
were, for the most part, exempt from governmental regulation. Thus, microfinance, in 
its initial years in Bangladesh, appeared to set up an ecosystem—albeit a fragile one—
that seemed, in defiance of conventional institutional wisdom, to achieve a high degree 
of functionality, largely informally.
The Golden Age of Microfinance: Microfinance Goes Global
By the 1980s, microfinance had become well known in development circles. The bor-
rower bases of Grameen and BRAC alone extended to several million, thriving against 
 at COLUMBIA UNIV on December 12, 2016pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
462 Politics & Society 44(4) 
the backdrop of one of the most dynamic NGO sectors in the world in Bangladesh: 
Grameen currently lends to approximately 8.4 million women and has replicas in 
eighty-four different countries,14 while BRAC boasts 7 million borrowers in Bangladesh 
alone and a global reach of over 100 million. By the 1980s the borrower bases of both 
had already reached millions. Its success led the model to be replicated within the 
country and, increasingly, to be embraced around the world. A defining characteristic 
of this period in the development of microfinance is that although the model went 
“global,” replicas maintained fidelity—in the main—to the original, and modifications 
did not compromise its core character. Thus the model lent itself to emulation on a 
wide scale with demonstrable success.
Another characteristic of this period was a fundamental shift in lending practices—
among the older, more established MFIs—from lending on a joint-liability basis to 
lending on an individual basis (in the case of the Grameen, this was identified as the 
shift from Grameen I to Grameen II). While longer-standing borrowers were gradu-
ated to individual lending, the original model was often retained for new regions or 
branches by older MFIs and was usually the model adopted by the new MFIs. Joint 
liability (or some version of it), thus, persisted as the “learner” model. The organiza-
tion of borrowers into groups, however, was retained irrespective of the modalities of 
the loan. It is significant that this shift in lending practices did not lead to any percep-
tible drop in repayment rates.15
Through the 1990s, microfinance emerged as one of the—if not the—most impor-
tant development program on the horizon. It was lent widespread support by interna-
tional organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, and replicas of it 
sprang up all over the world.16 The crowning glory vis-à-vis the recognition of micro-
finance came in 2006 when Yunus and the Grameen Bank were jointly awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize, leading Yunus to comment that microfinance would put “poverty 
in museums.”17 But while the data surrounding the poverty-alleviating effects of the 
institution sometimes seemed less convincing than its most ardent advocates thought,18 
there was substantial evidence of its socially transformative effects—including wom-
en’s empowerment.19
Ironically, the very success of the model may be contributing to its unraveling. 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the industry began to display an “irrational exuberance,” 
fueled by the legendary status Grameen had acquired, the easy availability of seed 
funding from domestic governments, international organizations and, increasingly, 
commercial sources convinced of the merits of the model, the persistence of large 
populations without access to finance through formal channels, the apparent ease of 
replicating the model, and the almost complete lack of regulation of the sector. This 
manifested itself as a dramatic proliferation in MFIs, alongside an ever-more aggres-
sive approach to extending the borrower base—and started to be accompanied by 
increasing reports of the use of coercion to enforce loan repayment. But the pressure 
to repay, coupled with the growing availability of credit from a multiplicity of lenders, 
resulted in what observers in the field call “overlapping”—or borrowers taking loans 
from one MFI to pay back another—and thereby getting caught in a debt-trap resulting 
in increasing calls (at first in Bangladesh, and then radiating out) for formal regulation 
of microfinance, altering its fundamental character.
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The Age of Crisis
The incipient changes in the functioning of the microfinance sector were observable in 
countries across the world, including its original home, Bangladesh,20 but nowhere did 
these developments unfold more rapidly than in India. Consequently, it was in India 
that this process reached its logical conclusion: the eventual inability of borrowers to 
repay loans, and the resultant risk of the collapse of the system. To some, microfinance 
in India was that country’s subprime crisis, marked by a similarly reckless expansion 
in predatory lending that characterized lending to the poor in the United States.21
In November 2010, the Indian microfinance industry—one of the biggest (with an 
estimated borrower base of 26.7 million)22 and the fastest growing in the world (report-
ing 80 percent growth annually in the four year run up to the crisis)23—was paralyzed 
as a result of the most serious repayment crisis in its history, with default rates rising 
to 90 percent.24 The immediate trigger for the crisis were village suicides in the state 
of Andhra Pradesh linked to the arm-twisting tactics allegedly used by the microfi-
nance industry to ensure loan repayment. This led to an almost immediate government 
takeover of microfinance lending operations and a freeze on the functioning of the 
country’s biggest MFI, the microfinance behemoth SKS founded by Vikram Akula.25 
It eventually resulted in the enactment of state legislation imposing serious restrictions 
on loan collection by MFIs. 26
The context of Indian credit markets was rather different from that of Bangladesh. 
Whereas the microfinance movement started in Bangladesh in the early 1980s, self 
help groups (SHGs) were the Indian analogue—it was only in the wake of economic 
liberalization in India in the 1990s that MFIs entered the picture. Although SHGs also 
involved group lending, they differed from microfinance in the degree of state involve-
ment in the model (particularly on the part of the National Bank for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, NABARD), as well as in the respect that its repayment rates typi-
cally fell far short of its MFI counterparts—with important implications for the finan-
cial sustainability of lender.27 The lending climate in Andhra Pradesh, specifically, is 
also highly relevant to the analysis. Home to a large number of SHGs, as well as the 
country’s five largest MFIs, it accounted for a third of India’s microfinance industry—
with total MFI lending amounting to approximately Rs 80 billion, or approximately $2 
billion. This meant that average debt per household in the state was significantly 
higher than the national average at Rs 65,000 as compared to Rs 7,700.28 Indeed, stud-
ies find that more than 83 percent of households had loans from more than one source 
(including traditional moneylenders)—with many juggling more than four loans.29
Even as many feared that the crisis would spread to the mainstream Indian banking 
sector, given its heavy investment in the microfinance industry,30 the central bank—the 
Reserve Bank of India—responded by instituting the Malegam Committee. Its report 
made several recommendations on the reform of the microfinance sector including lim-
iting competition,31 a cap on interest rates, and a ceiling on per-household lending.32 Its 
report is the precursor to national legislation to regulate the sector.33 Since the peak of 
the crisis, with regulation on the way and the threat to the Indian banking industry 
deemed minimal, relative calm appears to have been restored and the crisis more or less 
contained—and, although it has taken several years to recover, even SKS Microfinance 
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has survived. 34 It has, however, left a legacy of 10 million defaulters in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh—and, in all but name, abandoned any claim to poverty eradication.35 
The impact of the Indian crisis has, thus, been indelible: trust in the microfinance indus-
try has been shaken, leaving the industry in turmoil in countries as diverse as Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan36—and while the regulation of microfinance 
appears to be here to stay, its long-term impact remains uncertain.
Microfinance once distinguished itself on the basis that it targeted poverty reduc-
tion, on the one hand, reaching through informal means populations that formal credit 
markets neglected and, on the other, that it did not resort to the coercive enforcement 
mechanisms normally deployed in the informal credit markets. In its struggle to remain 
both effective and normatively acceptable, however, it is now on the cusp of returning 
to the traditional menu of institutional options—formalization or coercion.
The Grameen versus the SKS Model of Microfinance
Microfinance in South Asia alone was a complex multimillion dollar phenomenon of 
which Grameen and SKS are important—but not definitive—instances. Grameen, for 
all its attempts at embodying best practice, has been the object of scathing—and some 
justified—criticism,37 while the practice of microfinance in India, in general, goes 
well beyond SKS and has (Andhra Pradesh notwithstanding) proven to be fairly sus-
tainable. Nonetheless, we argue that Grameen and SKS typify, as heuristic devices, 
fundamentally different institutional approaches that account for the very different 
experiences of microfinance on either side of the India-Bangladesh border. In this sec-
tion we contrast, in some detail, the features of the two models that may explain the 
differences in their performance—and this account provides the detail and institutional 
texture to the analysis presented in the second half of the article.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the key distinction between the two models 
is that while Grameen is quintessentially a “tacit” or “specific” institution—funda-
mentally local or rooted, as are most “informal” institutions—the SKS gamble was 
premised on developing a “general purpose” or “blueprint” version of microfinance, 
imbued with the replicability characteristic of “formal” institutions.38 In aspiring to 
become a “global” rather than a “local” institution, however, SKS did not anticipate 
the losses in flexibility that would accompany gains in replicability—and how essen-
tial they were to the success of microfinance in the developing world context.
The Grameen Model of Microfinance
Group lending as institutional learning. The traditional model of microfinance estab-
lished by the Grameen Bank in 1976 was characterized by tremendous attention to 
detail and contextual specificity, in both design and implementation. Many of the fea-
tures that lie at the heart of the original microfinance model—the group system and 
weekly meetings—were described by Yunus not as a premeditated strategy for ensur-
ing repayment but, rather, as features that emerged organically from observation and 
reaction to the empirical realities on the ground:
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We started with a system of individual loans and daily repayment, but found that we 
were having trouble keeping track of and recording payments—so we made a shift to 
weekly meetings where installments would be collected. But even this started getting 
very chaotic, so we started dividing the borrowers into first two and then three groups to 
meet in and so on. Then, we had the idea to divide the groups into functional categories 
like the “chicken group” (members of which had taken loans for poultry farming), the 
“cow group” (members of which had taken loans for fattening cows), the “rickshaw” 
group (members of which had taken loans to buy rickshaws) and so on—but sometimes 
the purpose for which the loan was taken would change, and this led to further confusion. 
Also, the members of the group did not know each other and we noticed a certain 
distance between group members and group leaders that was problematic. So, next we 
did away with the idea of functional divisions and had the idea of bridging the gap 
between leaders and members by allowing people to form voluntary groups of between 
five and ten. It was seen that five was the natural tendency. The group was given the 
responsibility for loan collection. Then we introduced the system that the chairperson of 
the group needed to recommend a member for a loan. We observed that the chairperson 
quite enjoyed this power, but then we added that the chairperson was also responsible 
for loan repayment. The main function of the group was social, based on creating a sense 
of community.39
The groups are ideally suited to maximize the “information advantages” of moni-
toring, for instance by clubbing together those who live in the same part of the village 
and therefore have tacit knowledge of the activities of other group members—but are 
not related and, therefore, less likely to be incentivized (or gently socially coerced) 
into concealing defaults. Group members are also required to be from roughly similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds in order, for instance, to prevent implicit social domina-
tion of one group member over the others. Groups are further organized into “cen-
ters”—embedding the groups in the wider community still—classed under the 
supervision of a “center” manager, a Grameen employee with whom the members 
have ongoing interaction.
Lending to women. The decision to lend largely, or entirely, to women—now a distinc-
tive feature of microfinance globally—was also arrived at by trial and error. Indeed, 
for the first ten years of its operation, Grameen lent to both men and women, but it was 
only when the shift was made to lending mainly to women that it achieved the break-
through in repayment rates that are its hallmark. A senior official at Grameen justified 
the policy as follows:
The target group for Grameen is the family, and it has been found that family welfare is 
best served with women as the conduit: women are more concerned about family welfare 
and tend to be more forward-looking than men. Also, when wages are as low at $2 per 
day, just one wage earner in a family turns out to be insufficient and getting women of the 
house to earn augments family welfare. But Grameen also benefits the women themselves. 
Traditionally, there was no interface between commercial banks and women—but the 
activity of borrowing boosts the confidence of women borrowers, especially as a function 
of their having to learn to sign their names, learning to administer loans and so on.40
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The gendered character of microfinance has been the target of much criticism, 
Rahman41 argues that 60 percent of MFI finance in Bangladesh is de facto under the 
control of men—but even if this were true, the control that women have over loan 
access and use is still greater than in the conventional system. Indeed, studies find that, 
given the degree of male dominance in Bangladeshi society, the involvement of the 
husband in the loan venture might even be financially prudent.42 The broader empirical 
evidence seems to support the assertion that the targeted choice of MFI clients benefits 
not only the institution but the borrowers directly (e.g. in terms of decision-making 
within the household,43 reduced domestic violence,44 and even the capacity for collec-
tive action45), as well as in distributive impacts on family welfare.46
Integrated approach to lending. Grameen innovated its banking model to customize it to 
the needs of its unique clientele. Yunus writes at length about how the “bicycle bank-
ers” would ride through the villages acquainting themselves with the coy village 
women, typically by taking an interest in their children. Going forward, it developed a 
system of “flexiloans” that does not treat genuine defaults—precipitated, for instance, 
by natural disasters, illness, or business failure—on a par with strategic defaults, or 
deliberately not paying when the financial capacity exists to do so. Grameen also built 
financial discipline in borrowers—while mitigating its own risk—through holding ini-
tial deposits (roughly Tk 70) from members and forced savings schemes (e.g., a Tk 5 
deposit per week). These deposits are the bank’s first port of call in case of default. 
Grameen has also, over the course of its evolution, come to offer a range of financial 
services to its borrowers—including a pension scheme and a range of insurance poli-
cies (covering loans, life, and natural disasters).
Socialization. In the absence of the formal guarantees normally associated with giving 
out loans, Grameen relied, instead, on a rigorous process of socializing members—
cemented, incrementally, by ongoing ritual. New members would, for instance have to 
go through an intensive seven-day training program, involving a key family member 
(typically the husband) for one of those days. This initiation ritual would serve to accul-
turate the recruit into the “philosophy” of the Grameen, and the participation of a male 
family member would reduce familial resistance to the program—an instance of insight 
that only close engagement with the social context on the part of institution builders 
would yield. Members would also, at this point, be required to commit themselves to the 
“sixteen decisions”—a list of key aspirational ideals ranging from affirmations of group 
solidarity to vows to respect household hygiene and use contraception. The most impor-
tant of these rituals, by far, was the weekly group meeting, which served both as a social 
occasion and the moment at which members repaid their loan installments—in public.
Participatory structures/profits distributed to borrowers. The Grameen also experimented 
with a participatory structure. Members, newly inculcated into the ambit of credit 
markets, were given the opportunity to take on the position of group or center leader, 
and potentially to become one of the nine Grameen Bank board members (of thirteen) 
drawn from its borrower base. Borrowers with a balance above a certain minimum 
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level (Tk 100) were shareholders in the bank, and therefore its notional “owners.” 
Further, while Grameen proudly boasted of its financial sustainability and even prof-
its—these profits were ploughed back into other Grameen enterprises that either pro-
vided critical services to borrowers at subsidized rates or were distributed as dividends 
to the borrower-shareholders. At the other end of the spectrum, the heyday of Gra-
meen was associated with strikingly low levels of corruption on the part of bank 
employees, in a region notorious for small-scale bribery. This was facilitated by a 
combination of pecuniary (retirement benefits in cash meted out after an untarnished 
ten-year record) and nonpecuniary (a “star” system for centers evaluated on various 
criteria) incentives.
Gradual shift to individual lending. In its second iteration, when Grameen lending shifted 
explicitly from a joint liability system to individual lending, it built off the augmented 
financial discipline it had cultivated in previous years. The fact that this led to no 
appreciable decline in repayment rates would appear to provide compelling evidence 
in favor of the proposition that participation in the Grameen program had altered the 
norm system in a manner that continued to be in force once the ostensible external 
constraints had been removed—or, in economic terms, that the preferences of eco-
nomic agents had been shifted in the direction of more cooperative outcomes. Even if 
the sanctions threatened had played a role (and most interviews in the ground argue 
that this threat was more “academic” than real), after a period of time, the intrinsic 
rather than extrinsic factors appeared to be doing the heavy lifting.
The new system continues, however, to intertwine the economic fate of the indi-
vidual borrower with that of the group—the approval and size of an individual loan 
depends on the support of the group and the center, while the ratings of the group and 
center (that determine its credit worthiness) are linked to the performance of its indi-
vidual members. Thus, while the sanctioning mechanism is more diffuse than having 
to pay back the loan of a defaulting member (i.e. reputational effects with pecuniary 
impacts), the system continues to incentivize close monitoring of individual behavior 
by the group.
The SKS Model of Microfinance
Joint liability as a formula for rapid replication. SKS Microfinance, founded much later 
than Grameen, in 1998, initially showed substantial fidelity to conventional microfi-
nance—building on the successes of the Bangladeshi model and rising to become one 
of the fastest growing MFIs in history.47 The drive for this meteoric rise was provided 
by its founder: Akula, a US citizen, educated at Tufts, Yale, and Chicago, and deeply 
influenced by the work of Yunus. Akula, himself, emerged by the early 2000s as the 
new face of microfinance and a much-feted public figure: His list of accolades includes 
being named a Young Global Leader at the World Economic Forum in 2008, the Ernst 
and Young Entrepreneur of the Year twice over, in 2006 and 2010—and, finally, one 
of the world’s 100 most influential people by Time Magazine.48 Akula boasted a 
high-profile national and international media presence spanning extensive (often 
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front-page) coverage in the Wall Street Journal, on CNN, and in Forbes Magazine, 
among a slew of other platforms. Inspired by the Grameen model, SKS lending was 
based on joint liability, and it retained several of the community-building practices 
traditionally associated with microfinance, such as regular group and center meetings, 
and relationship-building visits from MFI workers. Indeed, the SKS version of micro-
finance was, for the most part, ostensibly indistinguishable from the Grameen version 
in the early years.
In the late 2000s, however, Akula decided to try a fundamental innovation on the 
Grameen model by developing the “scalable” version of microfinance. Attempting to 
marry Yunus’s novel lending model with “global business best practices”49—perhaps 
the product of the intellectual influences at Chicago (the incubator of classical “law 
and economics”) or his time spent as a management consultant at McKinsey—had 
been a longtime project of Akula’s. In contrast with the organic and empirically 
grounded evolution of the Grameen model, it sought—particularly in the joint liability 
scheme—a universal formula that could be applied mechanically irrespective of spe-
cific social conditions, enabling replication at an unprecedented scale and pace.
SKS Microfinance, thus, explicitly set out to develop an “assembly line,” or the 
“Coca-Cola or McDonald’s version of microfinance”—an efficient, replicable system 
that would ultimately achieve more or less universal coverage of its target market. As 
the SKS website stated:
With rapid scaling comes the challenge of building organizational capacity. Rather than 
look at conventional microfinance models, SKS based its business strategy on principles 
borrowed from fast-scaling consumer businesses. SKS standardized its products and 
front-line processes and adopted factory-style training models that have helped corporate 
giants scale up rapidly—thereby boosting our own workforce capabilities and growth.50
Shift to for-profit lending. Following from this was a well-developed justification for 
making the shift to a for-profit model: the ability to raise private equity investment so 
that the drive for expansion was not curtailed by availability of funds. The need was 
particularly acute in the Indian context, it was argued, where MFIs—unlike their Ban-
gladeshi counterparts—were debarred by law from holding deposits from borrowers. 
On the basis of the track record that SKS had established (albeit on the basis of follow-
ing the original microfinance template) and Akula’s well-articulated national and 
international links, it raised $350 million in 2010.51 Investors included Narayan Mur-
thy (founder of Infosys, the leading Indian IT company), Bajaj Allianz (a major Indian 
insurance company), Vinod Khosla (a Forbes-listed billionaire and one of the founders 
of Sun Microsystems), Sequoia Capital (a California-based venture capital firm) and 
even George Soros’s Quantum Hedge Fund, in a robust display of faith in the enter-
prise—and the initial IPO was fourteen times oversubscribed. But although SKS was 
not the first MFI to make the shift to the for-profit model (various MFIs, despite 
important detractors such as Yunus,52 had already made this move—most significantly 
Compartamos in Mexico),53 SKS was the only major MFI to make the shift while 
maintaining, at least initially with Akula at the helm, that its goal was the alleviation 
of poverty.
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Market competition and lack of personal relationships. The attempt to “mass manufacture” 
microfinance and the shift to for-profit lending, combined with its operation in an atmo-
sphere of market competition in Andhra Pradesh, in which at least 400–600 MFIs were 
active,54 fundamentally altered the traditional relationship between the MFI and the bor-
rower, turning it into a purely commercial transaction. The dynamics of a profit-driven 
credit provider answerable to shareholders and trying to outcompete other MFIs rapidly 
to maximize market share was at odds with the types of relationship-building initiatives 
and cross-subsidization that typified the original Grameen model55—incentivizing, on the 
other hand, excess lending by fueling a drive to increase loan disbursement at all costs 
(often irrespective of borrowing capacity). As Ballem and colleagues observed:
Most MFIs are mono-service credit companies providing standard basic joint liability 
group (JLG) loans to customers. There has been only a limited focus on clients; be it in 
terms of assessing their capacity to repay or in developing appropriate products to suit 
their needs. Microsave has often observed that despite the MFI management’s protestation 
to the contrary, most clients see MFIs as just another source of credit, rather than 
institutions interested in client welfare. The rapid influx of capital resulted in rapid 
expansion in scale without adequate investment in building customer relationships. This, 
combined with intense competition amongst MFIs and the resultant multiple lending, led 
to a situation where clients refer to MFIs as “Monday MFI,” “Tuesday MFI,” etc., 
depending on their collection schedules. This clearly demonstrates the lack of relationship 
between MFIs and their clients.56
The implications of this were not only adverse in normative terms, but also purely 
economically—eliciting less responsible behavior from agents than in the context of 
the “gift-exchange” paradigm, or crowding out “pro-social” behavior.57 The actions of 
SKS ended, in a sense, by slaying the goose that laid the golden eggs.
If joint liability per se were the central explanatory factor behind the working of 
microfinance—and functioned such that economically rational group members always 
exercised force on individual members who then responded, in the economically ratio-
nal way, by repaying—we would have no basis for understanding the Indian crisis, 
given its formal fidelity to the model. Indeed, within the standard “economic” inter-
pretation of microfinance, replication is straightforward. Its failure in the Indian con-
text seems to indicate that it works only when certain supporting social conditions 
(e.g., sufficient investment in the group to exercise peer monitoring, meaningful per-
sonal ties between borrowers and with the bank) are also in place; that is, joint liability 
does not seem to be a necessary, and sufficient, condition.
Political intervention and governmental regulation. Although the space initially yielded by 
the Bangladeshi government to microfinance is something of a mystery, the unravel-
ing of popular trust in microfinance paved the way for political intervention in the 
Indian case and, subsequently, elsewhere.58 In the spate of clampdowns on microfi-
nance, whatever their motivation, the practice will be fundamentally altered. The 
question is not so much whether regulation is a good or a bad thing, but rather that its 
introduction detracts from what has, so far, made microfinance unique—and that it 
will certainly raise costs. It is also far from clear that formal regulation of the sector is 
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inevitable. While governments may be acting to safeguard the interests of their people, 
it is also possible that they are taking advantage of an opportunity to undermine the 
credibility of their perceived rivals.59 In particular, given the traditional unpopularity 
of moneylenders, governments could be cashing in on ready political capital by char-
acterizing MFIs as “new-age moneylenders.”60
Abandoning the idea of poverty alleviation. The turn that SKS has taken, abandoning pov-
erty alleviation and empowerment of the poor as goals, indicates that there may be some 
truth to this allegation. In 2011—when “the firm was facing crisis with mounting losses, 
deteriorating asset quality, poor loan recoveries, and the absence of fresh funding”61—
the board of SKS removed Akula as chairman and board member (somewhat ironically 
given it was an organization he founded).
His exit made room for a fundamental shift in the lending philosophy of SKS. The 
new approach was summed up in an interview with the company’s new CEO and man-
aging director, M.R. Rao, and chief financial officer, S. Dilli Raj: “When we embraced 
the for-profit model, we should have discarded the larger-than-life claims and mission 
statements like empowering the poor and eradication of poverty. The for-profit model 
doesn’t go with this.”62
SKS Undermining the Core Institutional Character of the Grameen 
Model
Credit markets in South Asia have typically been dominated either by profit-driven for-
mal banks, reliant on an entire panoply of legal regulations that result in transaction costs 
too high to make the penetration of rural markets economically feasible—or, in rural 
areas, by traditional moneylenders, charging usurious interest rates and dependent on 
brute force and coercion as their enforcement mechanism. Against this background, the 
original Grameen-style microfinance model purported to achieve an important develop-
ment goal, namely, giving a difficult-to-reach demographic access to credit, without 
being driven by the profit motive, and while remaining financially sustainable. Moreover, 
it attempted to reach this goal by maintaining extremely high repayment rates without 
either relying on formal guarantees or resorting to the use of force. What was the expla-
nation for the efficient functioning of the original Grameen model: economic rationality 
or social embeddedness? How did the switch to the SKS model undermine it?
Analyzing the Roots of the Indian Crisis and Its 
Implications for Microfinance Theory
The Indian microfinance crisis was the product of a complex range of factors, but we 
argue that a deeper analysis of its root cause cuts to the debate that is central to microfi-
nance theory: whether the logic that drives it is essentially “economic” or “social.” In 
spite of its importance, the theoretical foundations of microfinance—or the factors that, 
at its heart, account for its success—remain disputed.63 The institutional innovation, or 
breakthrough, that microfinance makes is the substitution of the traditional forms of legal 
security in formal credit markets (i.e., contracts and collateral) with group lending, that is, 
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the organization of members into groups of five to ten members. What is less obvious is 
why group lending has proven so effective in promoting high repayment rates.
Competing Theories of Microfinance: Economic or Social Calculus?
Two distinct sets of theories address this question. The first—an older, more estab-
lished literature premised on the idea of the “rational actor” in economics—identifies 
the economic calculus of borrowers as the dominant force in the working model, 
whereas a newer interpretation—drawing on sociology, and a growing literature in 
social psychology and behavioral economics—argues that the borrower’s social ties or 
“social embeddedness” is the main factor accounting for its success.64
Central to the older theoretical literature is that joint and several liability—the fact 
that one group member’s ability to borrow depended on the others repaying—provides 
an effective, and informationally efficient, enforcement mechanism, based on the 
advantages of peer monitoring. The joint liability literature originated with one of us, 
Stiglitz—and led to a burgeoning of interest in the topic in the 1990s.65 But the change 
in contractual arrangements, discussed below, whereby individuals are not jointly and 
severally responsible for the debts of other members of the group, suggests that some-
thing else is at play.
The other strain of theorizing is based on the notion that the group replaces standard 
collateral with “social collateral,” a term originally coined by Besley and Coate in 199566 
and widely used by MFIs—as well as the idea that the group acts as a social support base 
for individual borrowers.67 One variant is based on the economists’ standard formulation 
of “social capital”—modeled as repeated interactions in which failure to comply with 
the cooperative action leads to punishment. In these models, borrowers are individually 
rational in engaging in cooperative actions (repaying loans, providing support to each 
other to enhance their ability to repay, etc.). This group of models can be simply seen as 
a multiperiod enforcement version of the simpler joint and several liability model. The 
alternative—and less widely accepted—approach focuses on broader theories of human 
behavior, where relationships and social connectedness may affect behavior even in the 
absence of any well-specified (or even tacit) set of consequences associated, say, with 
nonrepayment. This idea has been popularized in the economic literature by, for instance, 
Ferh and Fischbacher’s concept of “strong reciprocity.”68
The Importance of Empirical Evidence From Bangladesh and India
So how do we adjudicate between the alternative interpretations? We argue that the 
empirical evidence is critical. In this section, we intertwine theoretical literature with 
extensive qualitative data from original field research—particularly on the Grameen 
Bank, the archetype of the traditional Bangladeshi model of microfinance—to develop 
a more nuanced account of the functioning of the microfinance mechanism (at least in 
the pre-crisis era) and contend with the empirical challenges to the accepted theory.69 
Indeed, those who work on microfinance on the ground argue that the bulk of the 
extensive theoretical literature misrepresents the reality of the functioning of the sys-
tem, and is out of touch with current institutional developments.
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Three factors, in particular, indicate that the “social” interpretation of microfinance 
is the more accurate one: (1) repayment rates did not drop when MFIs switched from 
the joint liability model to individual lending; (2) a wave of speculative defaults did 
not occur when the very existence of several MFIs was threatened by floods; (3) 
despite fidelity to the form of the original model, rapid replication has led to defaults. 
That is, in the vein of Granovetter’s70 work on economic action’s being decipherable 
only in the context of social structure, the evidence would suggest that it is not the 
model per se that works, but only an embedded version of it.
Explaining the High Repayment Rates—Joint Liability or Social Capital?
The dominant theory of microfinance has focused on joint liability. Social capital—to 
the extent it plays a role—is interpreted as enhanced enforcement capacity in a multi-
period game and, not surprisingly, increases repayments.71 We argue, however, that 
this account is at best incomplete.
To simplify the analysis, we view the provision of credit as a contract—implicit 
or explicit—between lender and borrower. Standard, formal Western-style legal 
systems (say in advanced industrial countries) rely on “external enforcement,” that 
is, on an established third-party authority (that typically is, but need not be, the 
state) to enforce explicit contracts. The institutional innovation of microfinance lies 
in its ability to induce widespread entry into the lending contract (i.e., a high rate of 
loan disbursement) and compliance with its terms (i.e., high repayment rates) by 
“informal” means.72 The implicit contract, further, entails no collateral requirement 
and no formal legal contract.73 We argue that, contrary to what is held by much of 
the economics literature, the enforcement mechanism in microfinance is neither 
external, nor can the external enforcement be replaced by one variant or another of 
joint liability.74 We elucidate below a range of factors that contribute to the high 
repayment rates in terms both of the design and enforcement of the implicit con-
tract, but argue that the critical element at play is what is described as “pro-social 
disposition.”
Contract Design: The Shift from Formal to Informal 
Lending
Microfinance transformed the face of rural credit markets in South Asia by providing 
credit to millions typically denied access to finance as a result of costs for formal 
banks being too high—and thus left at the mercy of traditional moneylenders 
entrenched within the rural economy, but both extractive and coercive in their prac-
tices. It was able to bring more formalized credit (i.e., from the MFI rather than the 
moneylender) on more preferential terms to this demographic by removing certain 
barriers (such as collateral and formalities that made bank credit inaccessible) and 
reducing transaction costs of lending (by dispensing with expensive, often gratuitous, 
formal procedures and delegating other tasks like monitoring, via peer monitoring, 
that reduced operating costs). The shift to more informal and flexible lending practices 
were, thus, critical to the story of microfinance—but these made for a particularly 
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fragile institutional balancing act. We have provided detailed analysis of this else-
where, but summarize the arguments below. 
Collateral
The insight that collateral is not central to the success of a credit-delivery mechanism 
in developing countries, where claiming it through the judicial process is nearly impos-
sible, has been one of the most important factors contributing to the success of micro-
finance.75 Indeed, that ownership of collateral may have very little role in widening 
access to credit is illustrated by the evidence on the extremely poor performance of the 
high profile Peruvian land titling program, that resulted in no appreciable increase in 
access to credit despite the formalization of millions of plots of land with the express 
purpose of facilitating access to capital.76 Grameen’s success—as an interview with 
the former governor of Bangladesh Bank highlighted—demonstrates the relative 
importance of other factors such as monitoring and screening.77 Although the claim 
that Grameen loans are noncollateralized is contested by a small handful of observers 
on the ground,78 it is difficult to dispute that by doing away with the requirement of 
asset ownership, MFIs have enabled several million Bangladeshi women to gain 
access to credit where they would otherwise have found it impossible to do so.
As apologists have argued, although the MFI’s practice of holding borrowers’ sav-
ings and insisting on contributions to the “disaster fund” may be considered somewhat 
paternalistic, its benefits go beyond mere loss reduction.79 Forced savings provide 
insurance for the borrower in times of need,80 whereas the disaster fund has served the 
bank and its workers particularly well during the frequent floods, when the bank 
assumes responsibility for substantial reconstruction.
Flexibility of the Contract
Another aspect of the microfinance model that accounts for its success is the flexibility 
of the informal—or implicit—contract. On the demand side, that is, from the perspective 
of borrowers, the fact that the terms of the contract are malleable encourages those who 
would normally have been deterred by the more restrictive terms of a formal contract.81
Although the terms of a formal contract are largely fixed, and changing them could 
be expensive, the flexibility of the informal system allows shocks to be absorbed more 
readily82—as demonstrated by the recovery of Grameen in the wake of the 1998 
floods.83 The social contracts in-built in the microfinance model may play an impor-
tant role both in preventing borrower abuse of this provision and in the creditor’s tak-
ing advantage of a borrower’s admission of weakness to drive a hard bargain.
Contract Enforcement: Legal, Economic, and Social 
Sanctions
There are two possible reasons why individuals repay loans: either they fear the con-
sequences to themselves that follow from nonrepayment (legal, economic, or social 
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punishment), or they believe it is the right thing to do; that is, they have been social-
ized to repay—they internalize the social consequences of nonrepayment (when they 
could have repaid).84 The dominant enforcement mechanism in the case of microfi-
nance is plainly not legal (since it entails no formal legal contracts, or collateral)—so 
the debate is with regard to whether the mechanism is primarily economic (the opera-
tion of a universal economic logic that underwrites joint liability, or the functioning of 
the rational actor model) or social (either fear of sanctions imposed from without, or 
value systems that flow from within). 
An extensive survey of the literature as well as wide-ranging field interviews pro-
vide competing accounts of the reasons behind the success of microfinance in ensuring 
the repayment of loans—without the security of either formal legal contracts or col-
lateral. We summarize below the most widely accepted alternative explanations before 
presenting our own interpretation.
Legal Mechanisms
The premise of legal sanctions are clear: you are punished by the law if you do not 
comply with what it requires. To the extent that microfinance lending is based on nei-
ther the holding of collateral nor the signing of a legally binding contract, there are few 
legal consequences of defection or nonrepayment (notwithstanding the theoretical 
possibility of a contract being imputed by the law). But would the existence of such 
sanctions have aided the model? It is precisely these sorts of requirements that formal 
lenders typically rely on—and the expense associated with these procedures has made 
the disbursement of small loans in far-flung areas highly uneconomical, thereby 
depriving these regions of access to formal credit. Similarly, state agricultural banks 
have attempted—unsuccessfully—to rely on formal legal sanctions to recover loans. 
Indeed, several interviewees in the field reiterated that the threat of punishment via the 
state legal system may often appear empty in the context of a country like Bangladesh—
where the costs and complexities associated with loan recovery by formal means are 
so great that the threat is, effectively, an empty one.85
Economic Mechanisms
Joint liability. Under a strict regime of joint liability—where the capacity of one mem-
ber of the group depends on others repaying—the financial motive to be invested in 
the compliance of other group members is obvious. Indeed, to the extent that others 
bear some of the consequences for nonrepayment, it is designed to incentivize peer 
monitoring (see below), cooperation, and selection. As discussed above, it is this 
explanation that the formal literature has emphasized—but, in practice, there is little 
evidence that others have, in fact, had to pay in the event of default by the borrower.
Reputation and refinancing. An obvious reason why borrowers repay is the threat that 
defaulters will not be refinanced. Access to credit is valuable, and the Grameen 
model—where those who behave well may avail of increasing amounts of credit—
enhances the penalty of nonrepayment.86 (For the termination of credit to provide an 
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effective incentive, it must, of course, not be possible for the borrower to obtain credit 
at comparable terms, say from informal money lenders—making it imperative for 
microfinance lenders to keep interest rates, at least relatively, low.87)
An increasingly important feature contributing to the desire for borrowers to main-
tain a positive reputation through high repayment rates is the ever-growing interlink-
ing of markets, or, the expansion of most major MFIs into other markets that impact 
borrowers, thereby increasing the stakes in the relationship between bank and bor-
rower.88 Grameen, for instance, diversified into areas as varied as electricity genera-
tion, information technology, education, telecommunications, and textiles—enterprises 
that permeate the lives of borrowers in a variety of different ways.89
Peer monitoring and information. The formal economic literature growing out of Sti-
glitz’s 1990 paper has tended to explain the high repayment rates of MFIs in terms of 
peer monitoring incentivized by joint liability. Since the “mutual enforcement 
model”90—or informal law—requires that breaches be observable but not necessarily 
publicly verifiable,91 the information costs associated with it are inherently lower. This 
model has significant informational advantages over formal regulation since the com-
munity is far better poised than formal institutions to monitor the actions of borrow-
ers—and is able to do so far more economically. Though Stiglitz did not focus on the 
problem of adverse selection, peers are also in a better position to ascertain who are 
most likely to repay. Thus, the Grameen model is able to address better both problems 
of “moral hazard”92 and “adverse selection.”93
These informational advantages are also a critical factor in allowing the flexibility 
of design discussed above, enabling strategic defaults (attempt at evading repayment) 
to be relatively easily distinguished from genuine ones (due to unforeseeable circum-
stances, such as a natural disaster or sickness in the family). Not only does this imply 
that these contracts have better in-built mechanisms of insuring against risk—but they 
allow the lender to give loans to those considered riskier borrowers as well, making 
the system inherently more inclusive.94
The lowering of the information costs of monitoring (by delegating this task to the 
community through peer monitoring) has certainly been an important feature contrib-
uting to the success of microfinance. The evidence seems to suggest, however, that 
peer monitoring could function even without the strict operation of joint liability, on 
the basis of the existence of a sense of community—and the fact that repayment rates 
remained high even as the joint and several liability system was given up suggests that 
something else is central to the success of the Grameen model.95
Peer monitoring—seen as part of “social capital”—can, however, be an important 
part of the explanation of the success of microfinance. Individual behavior is affected 
by whether it is observed by those whose respect they want to earn and maintain. Some 
individuals may repay loans simply because it is the right (moral) thing to do, but other 
individuals may be more likely to repay if others are observing their behavior.
Social Mechanisms
Social capital and norm creation. An alternative set of explanations of the working of 
microfinance focuses on “social capital.”96 The term is used in two different senses. In 
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the first, it is just another name for “implicit contracts” or “social contracts” enforced 
through a repeated game, where the members of the society (group) have strategies 
that serve to enforce the desired behavior.97 This is simply a generalization of the 
incentive structure discussed earlier: the withdrawal of future access to credit by 
someone who doesn’t repay. But social cohesion, thus defined, can be broader: coop-
eration may entail helping other members of the group with their productive activities, 
thereby enhancing their ability to repay. While joint and several liability may enhance 
the incentives to engage in these kinds of cooperative activities, they are not neces-
sary. The dependence of an individual’s access to credit on the repayment of others in 
the group incentivizes this kind of cooperative behavior within the group. This is 
important, because repayment rates held up even when Grameen abandoned joint and 
several liability.
A second, broader, interpretation of social capital, sees being connected, and main-
taining the affection and respect of those with whom one is closely connected, as an 
essential aspect of advancing one’s own sense of well-being.98 Indeed, there are at 
least two significant strains of literature supporting the hypothesis that behavioral 
norms are not merely those supported by repeated games: one stemming from evolu-
tionary biology and grounded in genetic characteristics;99 and another, derived from 
sociology, that talks about the cultural determination of preferences (e.g., that I feel 
good about myself for having treated others fairly).100
We believe that a major factor contributing to the efficacy of the microfinance 
model are successful attempts at social capital building (in this broader sense) and 
establishment of positive norms (concerning not just repayment but support for 
other members of the group) that are internalized by members. This was partly the 
result of the institutional innovation of the group mechanism, discussed at length 
above—which was structured to strengthen social capital. The cultivation, and 
use, of social capital is facilitated by the criteria for selection of members to con-
stitute the group—lending to groups of relatively homogenous women turned out 
to be far more effective than more mixed groups (in terms of both gender and 
social class).101 Further, it is important that the group develops a meaningful social 
identity before the economic calculus enters the picture—cemented by the organi-
zational ritual surrounding group formation, such as weekly meetings. But in their 
attempt to create social capital, both BRAC and Grameen went well beyond the 
group mechanism: in BRAC, for example, with education, legal assistance, and 
health programs. A former Bangladeshi cabinet minister (in the “caretaker govern-
ment”)—trained as both sociologist and economist—explicitly highlighted the 
building of social capital:
One of the key reasons for the success of the borrower-lender relationship within the 
microcredit paradigm is the mobilization of social capital and the ability to tap into it. The 
second reason for its success is its specificities: the ritual surrounding the formation of 
the group, the idea of the weekly meetings and so on, help to create a strong group 
identity over and above the economic rationale of microcredit. . . . The wider impact of 
the Grameen is not in the economic arena but in the psychological, sociocultural domain. 
The real change is occurring in the domain of ideas.”102
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The original idea that motivated microfinance, focusing on lending to women 
among the poorest of the poor, was intended to change the political balance of power 
within the community and the family, and this in itself may have contributed to a sense 
of identity among the broader members of the microfinance community.
One means of probing whether the “economic” or the “social” rationale is driving 
repayment is analyzing what happens when borrowers think that the lender is “going 
under”: The fact that there were no mass defaults when the Grameen’s future was cast 
in doubt by the floods of the 1980s provides evidence for the proposition that it had, 
indeed, created norms of repayment amongst members, that went beyond pure eco-
nomic interest.103 As summarized by one commentator: “In Bangladesh it has now 
become a social norm to repay MFIs. The theoretical literature variously attributing 
repayment to group liability, peer pressure, and so on, is therefore irrelevant.”104
If this account of the reasons that underlie repayment success is true, then critical 
to the success of the microfinance enforcement mechanism is its essentially participa-
tory character that allows the problem of apathy (or antipathy) of agents toward the 
system to be overcome and enforcement to be achieved through internal legitimacy 
rather than third-party enforcement.
Coercion. There is one final type of enforcement mechanism—also of a broadly “social” 
nature, albeit significantly less normatively desirable than “social capital”—that has 
been used in credit markets since time immemorial: coercion. Indeed, some critics of the 
original microfinance model (and especially of Grameen) claim that incentive mecha-
nisms akin to those of the old moneylenders (including the Mafia in the United States), 
are increasingly prevalent: brute force, intimidation, and threats by MFI workers.105
Reports of the use of force, even of a rather extreme nature—for instance, refusing 
to let the dead body of a member be removed till debts were cleared,106 pulling down 
tin roofs of the huts of villagers,107 threatening mothers over the safety of their daugh-
ters, even driving women into prostitution to repay debts108—have not been uncom-
mon in the context of the microfinance industry. Although these reports have largely 
been of an anecdotal nature, if true more generally, MFIs have just—as alleged by 
some in the field—relapsed into the practices of traditional village moneylenders.109 
Indeed, according to some observers, the use of force in loan collections—both violent 
and in the form of psychological pressure—has long been the norm rather than the 
exception. To Grameen’s critics, such coercion is a natural consequence of the priority 
placed on repayment.110
Several features of microfinance potentially contribute to coercion being deployed 
as an enforcement mechanism. The first of these is the emphasis (in contrast to the 
“soft loans” typically given out by government agricultural banks) on loan repayment. 
While this characteristic, central to the microfinance model, is motivated by the desire 
to keep the institution financially sustainable while also building the financial disci-
pline and work ethic of borrowers, there are some allegations of loan repayment being 
fetishized within the system and taken too literally by bank workers (i.e., as an end in 
itself rather than a means to an end). Second, the operation of some type of peer moni-
toring incentivizes group and community involvement in loan repayment— but can, 
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sometimes, backfire as excessive pressure to repay. Much of this is endemic to the 
nature of “implicit”—versus explicit—contracts. Lawyers and human rights activists, 
in particular, expressed concerns about lack of procedural propriety in MFI practice. 
They emphasized the importance of a “rights-based” approach to lending so that bor-
rowers do not start to feel as though the loan provider “owns” them.111 Indeed, on this 
view, requiring collateral is procedurally preferable to using force to recover loans 112—
loan repayment pressure, even when psychological rather than physical, can be a 
source of domestic violence and heightened social unrest, among a host of other social 
ills.113 As discussed above, however, the informal mechanisms employed by microfi-
nance are critically important in lowering costs and enabling it to be more inclusive 
than formal banks—and, as several interviewees in the field emphasized, psychologi-
cal pressure to repay loans is not alien to formal credit markets either.
The most pernicious element in giving rise to increasing use of coercion is, how-
ever, the following: as discussed above, one of the consequences of increased entry 
into microfinance is increasing competition in the microfinance industry and the 
occurrence of “overlapping” whereby borrowers have loans from several lenders. This 
means that MFIs have to compete with each other to be repaid—and thus resort to 
“bullying” tactics.114
It is clear that there has long been evidence of at least occasional use of force in the 
practice of microfinance, but the key question is whether, in the context of the original 
microfinance model, it was the norm or the exception. Representatives of the MFIs 
and sympathetic observers denied that coercion is the major driver in the success of the 
microfinance experiment.115 They admit that lapses into the use of coercion may occur, 
but sporadically rather than as a trend; they argue also that without a very high mea-
sure of consensus the scheme would have been unsustainable.116 
The most compelling evidence for this proposition seems to be provided by its cur-
rent “era of crisis” (to use the nomenclature from a previous section): in instances or 
regions where coercion appears to have become the main enforcement mechanism 
(such as in the SKS case in India or Compartemos in Mexico), the operation of micro-
finance has been met with mass protests and this fundamental shift in character has 
come to light. Although use of coercive tactics increased progressively in the transi-
tion of the original microfinance model from what we have called the “boutique 
moment” to the “golden age,” it does not follow that, until recently, coercion was 
dominant in sustaining that model.
What Made Grameen-Style Microfinance Work?
There are several different types of contract enforcement mechanisms.117 The first, 
“mutual affection,” is based on group members caring about one another. The second 
is “pro-social disposition,” based on norms of reciprocity, such as might arise out of 
evolutionary development and socialization. The third “mutual enforcement” is based 
on fear of social sanction in the context of long-term, settled relationships in a com-
munity where people encounter each other repeatedly in the same situation.118 These 
three enforcement mechanisms are central to “informal” legal systems. The fourth is, 
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of course, the external enforcement that characterizes formal legal systems, or coer-
cion within an informal system. Table 1 summarizes the key enforcement mechanisms 
typically used by credit providers.
The success of the enforcement mechanisms adopted by the microfinance model 
probably lies in a combination of all of these elements. They are, for the most part, not 
mutually exclusive (though the use of coercion is likely to undermine social capital). 
While there does appear to be evidence of the sporadic use of force, it seems unlikely, 
on balance, that the membership base of Grameen and that of most other “first” and 
“second” generation MFIs—could have reached millions if this was the dominant 
mode of enforcing repayment. Moreover, the reports of the use of coercion increased 
gradually as the microfinance industry grew—driven by factors that ultimately pre-
cipitated the crisis.
While it is important to determine the relative importance of these elements in 
accounting for the success of microfinance, in Bangladesh, where microfinance has 
been the most successful, and given credit for affecting even aggregate statistics, 
social capital and norm setting seems as or more important than any other explana-
tion—not just in the narrower sense of self-interested action motivated by repeated 
games, but in the broader sense that we have presented.
The original microfinance model discovered, to put it simply, that it was both 
cheaper and more effective to sanction defaults through social disapproval (e.g., a bor-
rower who willfully does not repay not being invited to the village Eid celebration) 
than through legal action that is both costly and, frequently, logistically infeasible. But 
for the social context effectively to change norms or shift preferences—or for com-
munity sanctioning to function—it is critical for a meaningful sense of community to 
exist, and building this can often be a time- and labor-intensive process. In the absence 
of individual economic rationality, as assumed by the rational actor model (underpin-
ning, for instance, the effectiveness of joint liability), short-circuiting this process—as 
the SKS model attempted—can be highly problematic.
Scale and Social Capital: The SKS Experiment
The institutional triumphs of microfinance have been twofold. The first is widening 
the population that has access to credit by means of sidestepping the traditional legal 
requirements attached to credit (such as collateral and formal contracts), namely, by 
Table 1. Credit Market Contract Enforcement Mechanisms.
Formal Informal
Legal Contracts / collateral  
Economic Rational actors displaying utility maximizing behavior
Social Social norms / shifting preferences
 Coercion
Source: Authors.
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means of an informal contract designed to be more structurally inclusive. The second 
is effectively enforcing the contract by recovering loans without the expense of formal 
legal methods or, for the most part, by reverting to the method traditional in informal 
markets, coercion. The novel institutional structure of microfinance—is summarized 
in Table 2.
The key debate is, then, whether the group lending mechanism around which 
microfinance is built has been largely “economic” (based on joint liability, or more 
generally, the economic rationality of actors) or “social” (in the sense of changing 
social norms or shifting preferences). We have argued that the Indian microfinance 
crisis helps shed light on this question.
Indeed, the magnitude of the crisis in Indian microfinance—clocking 10 million 
defaulters in the state of Andhra Pradesh—is such that it appears to be the product of 
the erosion of something fundamental to the model.119 The four separate, but related, 
developments driven by SKS in the context of Indian microfinance outlined above—
the attempt to “mass manufacture” or “scale up” microfinance, the introduction of 
widespread market competition, the shift to the for-profit model and the increasing 
incidence of political intervention in the industry—had the cumulative effect of desta-
bilizing the performance of microfinance in its area of core competence, achieving 
high repayment rates.
The issue of replication is an effective means of testing the relative merits of the 
“economic” and “social” theories of microfinance. The purely economic account of 
microfinance that interprets the model as merely replacing the external enforcement 
(via formal contracts and collateral) of traditional credit markets with an equally formu-
laic solution—joint liability—trivializes the problem of replication: If just putting bor-
rowers into groups of five with joint liability is what accounts for the success of the 
model, irrespective of social context or social ties, then the organization of lending on 
that basis should reliably result in the predicted high repayment rates. This was the 
premise that the SKS model of microfinance was based on—that joint liability could 
serve as an easy “blueprint” for replication, rather than microfinance being an inher-
ently “tacit” or “specific” institution. If, on the other hand, the social version is the more 
appropriate one so that social embedding of the model, or establishing social links that 




Formal banks (commercial 





Informal moneylenders Social (coercion) Expensive, but effective
Microfinance institutions: group 
lending
Economic (joint liability & 
peer monitoring) and/or 
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trigger reciprocity, is critical (as the evidence from the Grameen case seems to indicate) 
then institutional replication becomes a much more complex problem.
The high repayment rates for which microfinance is known can be sustained by 
means other than building social capital—but the system then reverts to the conven-
tional mechanisms of formal contracts and collateral (with a fraught institutional leg-
acy in credit markets of the developing world and negative impacts on inclusivity), or 
to the highly retrograde mechanisms of brute force and coercion. Either results in the 
essence of the microfinance model being lost—making it indistinguishable, at the 
core, from either formal lenders or traditional moneylenders. This is summarized in 
Table 3.
In an emblematic victory for the traditional microfinance model, Akula admitted to 
the greater wisdom of the figure who initially inspired him, Yunus: “Bringing private 
capital into social enterprise was much harder than I anticipated.”120 But if Akula, 
however misguided, was in honest pursuit of an innovative model, the turn that SKS 
has taken in its new iteration—disavowing any commitment to poverty alleviation—
foretells an even more worrying future for the story of microfinance.
The first wave of microfinance almost certainly claimed too much, it now looks 
very unlikely, for instance, that microfinance alone will make poverty a thing of the 
past. But in ameliorating abject economic exclusion, bringing about social change 
and building community networks, the original breed of MFIs performed crucially 
important functions. The challenge for microfinance, then, is fundamentally to 
regain what it once built itself on—trust. It is unlikely that this can be achieved 
without a reversion to the not-for-profit model and the careful cultivation of social 
capital, which in turn will place inherent limits on the speed at which microfinance 
can be scaled up. If these brakes fail to be put on the evolution of the industry, the 
noble vision with which microfinance started runs the risk of being reduced to mere 
moneylending.
Conclusion
Microfinance stood out, until recently, as one of the most innovative and promising of 
development interventions of recent times—in South Asia and worldwide. Approaching 
Table 3. Effect of Crisis on Microfinance Group Lending.
Pre-Crisis: Group Lending Post-Crisis: Breakdown of Group Lending
Economic Legal















Note: Post-crisis options represent a reversion to the enforcement mechanism of banks or 
moneylenders, as shown in Table 2.
Source: Authors.
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the seemingly vexed institutional problem of lending in rural credit markets of the 
developing world—it appeared to have developed the revolutionary new technology 
of “group lending” to navigate a middle ground between the expenses and exclusivity 
of formal lending and the tyrannical practices of informal moneylenders, while sus-
taining extremely high repayment rates.
In the light of the Indian microfinance crisis that left a legacy of 10 million default-
ers in the state of Andhra Pradesh and damaged the reputation of the industry world 
over, we set out, in this article, to explain the contrasting experience of microfinance 
in Bangladesh and India—or to answer the question of why a model that appeared to 
have emerged as a paragon in one context failed so dramatically in another. The mag-
nitude of the Indian crisis is such, we argued, that it provides evidence of the erosion 
of something fundamental to the microfinance model—and sheds light on the long-
standing question of what the essence of microfinance really is.
We traced the evolution of microfinance through various “generations”—going 
from being an intimate small-scale experiment in Bangladesh to being a global devel-
opmental phenomenon to, ultimately, being in the throes of crisis. The key change, in 
this process, as we highlighted, was the shift from the “Grameen model” to the “SKS 
model” as the focal instance of the practice of microfinance. While the Grameen model 
situated lending in the context of a complex network of relationships (between bank 
and borrower, as well as borrowers themselves) involving an explicit focus on social 
ritual, a self-consciously participatory structure and an institutional presence that went 
beyond just the credit contract, the SKS model took a more clinical, economistic view 
of microfinance—less focused on what it considered to be the dispensable background 
conditions that supported the success of the Grameen model, and more on what it 
deemed the core of microfinance: group lending. In particular, the SKS model aimed to 
overcome the niche, localized quality that it argued had, thus far, characterized micro-
finance and to develop the fast-scaling “universal” version of it—fueled by the logic of 
the market, both in terms of for-profit investment raised from capital markets and the 
terms of the lender-borrower relationships being defined by market competition.
The formula on which SKS based its rapid replication was group lending—inter-
preted, in keeping with the dominant economic orthodoxy, as joint liability and the 
assumption that it functioned mechanically as a matter of economic rationality (irre-
spective of the framing conditions of the lending relationship). We have argued that 
this is a misinterpretation of what lay at the heart of the original microfinance model 
and its success—and is the root cause of its current crisis. We contend, instead, that it 
is social capital—broadly interpreted in terms of human altruism and reciprocity—that 
was the main factor that accounted for the triumphs of the Grameen version of micro-
finance in Bangladesh. In adjudicating between the “economic” and “social” accounts 
of microfinance, the litmus test was the formal shift by Grameen and other first gen-
eration MFIs from group to individual lending: with no impact on repayment rates. 
But, equally, evidence in favor of the social account is provided by the devastating 
impact of the rapid replication of SKS on repayment rates: demonstrating that the 
formal application of joint liability—in the absence of social embeddedness—is sim-
ply not a sufficient condition for the working of microfinance.
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If, as the empirical evidence on the ground seems to suggest, joint liability is a 
myth—and, as recent developments in behavioral economics and social psychology 
would indicate, the rational actor model, or pure economic rationality, goes only part 
of the way in explaining human behavior in credit markets and other contexts—the 
two enforcement mechanisms available are legal or social. Although legal enforce-
ment of the credit contract may, at least in theory, be the most normatively desirable 
and procedurally just enforcement mechanism (and formal regulation an increasingly 
important part of the microfinance industry), for reasons we have discussed at length 
elsewhere, at least in the context of the developing world, the shift from informal to 
formal lending will come with significant increases in cost and a concomitant adverse 
impact on inclusivity. That leaves social enforcement as the most likely choice, at least 
in the case of rural credit markets of the developing world—and either a reversion to 
the preferred mode of enforcement of traditional moneylenders, namely, brute force 
and coercion (of which there are increasing reports in the microfinance industry), or a 
return to the more innocent, if less ambitious, version of microfinance based on social 
capital, norm creation, and preference shifting. In resorting to coercion, microfinance 
sacrifices its normative value, and in lapsing to formal regulation—while preferable—
it risks losing its novelty. Both developments detract from what has, so far, made 
microfinance unique.
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But although social capital can improve the functioning of markets, and under perfect 
competition the gains from social capital will accrue to borrowers, in most real world set-
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ior—the parents were happy to pay the fine and be spared the moral responsibility they 
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imputes a contract contrary to the intentions of the bank. Since no legal action has in fact 
been taken by the bank against a borrower, this remains a point of academic debate.
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 75. Of course, much lending in advanced industrial countries is also not collateral-based, but 
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of the corporation or the individual (that has not otherwise been put up for collateral) act 
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fund for the MFI. Personal interview at the headquarters of prominent Bangladeshi NGO 
Nijera Kori, Dhaka, April 24, 2009.) But such collateral typically offsets only a small part 
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March 21, 2009.
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would mitigate these risks, but even in the best of circumstances (and poor developing 
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to establish such good reputations. In advanced countries, loan flexibility provides an 
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contractual relations in Bangladesh don’t work because the threat of being taken to 
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of redress.
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2009.
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and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets,” 
American Economic Review 72. no. 4 (1982): 695–715; see also T. Besley, “Nonmarket 
Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries,” Journal of Economic 
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April 18, 2009.
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Labor Markets,” American Economic Review 73, no. 5 (1983): 912–27, show the threat 
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J.E. Stiglitz, “Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets: Puzzles and Policy 
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(education), Grameen Star Education Ltd., Grameen Knitwear, Gonoshastaya Grameen 
Textile Mills Ltd, Grameen Bitek Ltd, Grameen Uddog (enterprise), Grameen Shamogree 
(products), Grameen Capital Management Ltd, Grameen Byabosa Bikash (business pro-
motion), Grameen Health Care Trust, Grameen Healthcare Services Ltd, Grameen Veolia 
Water Ltd., and, the world’s first “social-business enterprise,” Grameen Danone Food 
Ltd. It is notable that Grameen Bank does not own shares in these companies. They are 
independent companies bound by the usual tax and other obligations. See, further, M. 
Yunus, Creating a World without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
 89. Thus, not only may a person be a Grameen borrower, but Grameen may, at the same 
time, be her employer, bank, source of infrastructural facilities, or provider of goods and 
services and may run her daughter’s school. The omnipresence of Grameen and some 
other leading Bangladeshi NGOs has led to speculation about their having become para-
governmental organizations. 
 90. P. Dasgupta, “Social Capital and Economic Performance: Analytics,” in E. Ostrom and 
T.K. Ahn, eds., Critical Writings in Economic Institutions: The Foundations of Social 
Capital (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003); online at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.127.8067&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
 91. Typically a “lower” standard, i.e., many observable breaches may not be easily verifi-
able by an independent court, especially when courts are circumscribed in the kinds of 
evidence that are admissible, and borrowers know this.
 92. This is a technical term used in the economic literature to describe the difference 
between a person insulated from risk and another fully exposed to risk in a particu-
lar situation. On the advantages of the microfinance model in avoiding this prob-
lem, see R. Arnott and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: 
Dysfunctional Crowding Out of Peer Monitoring?,” American Economic Review 81, 
no. 1 (1991): 179–90.
 93. This economic term refers to “bad” results in market processes that arise from buyers 
and sellers having asymmetric information. On the benefits of the microfinance model in 
dealing with this problem, see M. Ghatak, “Group Lending, Local Information.”
 94. B. Wydick, “Can Social Cohesion Be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence 
from Group Lending in Guatemala,” Economic Journal 109, no. 457 (1999): 463–75, 
finds evidence of this insurance dimension of group lending.
 95. See, e.g., A. Jain, “Managing Credit for the Rural Poor: Lessons from Grameen Bank,” 
World Development 24, no. 1 (1996): 79–89). We have, however, already noted that, even 
in the absence of joint and several liability, cooperative behavior can also be induced by 
making access to future credit dependent on group repayment.
 96. Haldar and Stiglitz, “Undue Credit” and, “Analyzing Legal Formality and Informality.”
 97. It should be emphasized that socially desirable behavior can be so enforced, but so too 
can less desirable forms of behavior, such as caste, race, and gender discrimination. See, 
e.g., F. Fukuyama, “Social Capital” in L.E. Harrison and S.P. Huntington, eds., Culture 
Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
 98. See, e.g., Putnam, Bowling Alone; J.E. Stiglitz, A.K. Sen, and J.P. Fitoussi, Mismeasuring 
Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up (New York: New Press, 2010).
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 99. See, e.g., E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), which popularized a field that attempts to explain social behav-
ior of animals in terms of genetics, evolution, and natural selection. There is hefty debate 
as to the exact evolutionary drive behind eusocial behaviors such as cooperation and 
altruism, but it is agreed that eusocial and prosocial behavior evolved over years of natu-
ral selection, and that these behaviors are inherent in our genes. See M.A. Nowak, “Five 
Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation,” Science 314 (2006): 1560–63.
100. A study of “ethics and compliance” initiatives in the corporate world, T. Tyler, J. 
Dienhart, and T. Thomas, “The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building Value 
Based Cultures,” California Management Review 50, no. 2, (2008): 31–51, found that 
the “values and integrity” approach to promoting compliance was far more effective 
than the traditional “command-and-control” approach. See also L.S. Paine, “Managing 
for Organizational Integrity,” Harvard Business Review 72, no. 2 (1994): 106–17; L.K. 
Trevino, G.R. Weaver, D.G. Gibson, and B.L. Toffler, “Managing Ethics and Legal 
Compliance: What Works and What Hurts,” California Management Review 41, no. 2 
(1999): 131–51.
101. A senior associate at BRAC emphasized the aspects of the group mechanism that pro-
mote loan repayment:
 The fact that groups are homogenized and lending is mostly to poor women is impor-
tant. In the early 1970s, with nonhomogenous groups, the system didn’t work. Mixed 
groups of men and women were highly ineffective. Money entered the picture much 
later, when members of the group already knew each other. The social function of the 
selection of women as borrowers is crucial since the sense of responsibility of women, 
their commitment to the household and children and their traditional role as custodi-
ans of “family honor” lend themselves well to the functioning of the mechanism.
 Personal interview, BRAC Institute of Governance, Dhaka, March 24, 2009.
102. Personal interview, Power and Participation Research Centre Office, Dhaka, March 29, 
2009.
103. This factor was alluded to by an internationally renowned economist and microfi-
nance researcher interviewed. Personal interview at the office of the BRAC Institute of 
Development Studies, Dhaka, April 17, 2009.
104. Personal interview with the former Chairman of the Palli Karma Shohayok Foundation 
the Institute of Microfinance at his Motijheel residence, April 1, 2009.
105. This allegation was made in the academic literature early on by Rahman and Mallick, 
and such claims have since become more widespread. Rahman. Women and Microcredit 
in Bangladesh; R. Mallick, “Implementing and Evaluating Microcredit in Bangladesh,” 
Development in Practice 12, no. 2 (2002): 153–63.
106. Personal interview with a prominent Bangladeshi international lawyer at his Gulshan 
residence, Dhaka, April 3, 2009.
107. Personal interview with a well-known Bangladeshi economist (formerly at Dhaka 
University and now founder of his own think tank on development) at the Unnayan 
Parishad office, April 27, 2009.
108. Personal interview with an extremely high-profile lawyer with close ties to the Hasina 
administration at the Sonar Bangla Hotel, Dhaka, April 3, 2009.
109. This is specifically the allegation that Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladeshi prime minister, 
makes against Yunus.
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110. According to one human rights activist interviewed, the use of force—both violent and 
in the form of psychological pressure—is common practice: “These are situations in 
which the MFI is forcing people to repay who can’t. For the ground staff, everything—
from their salary to their prospects of promotion—depends on their being able to collect 
repayment.” Personal interview, Nijera Kori office, April 24, 2009. Another well-known 
economist put it as follows: “The purpose of the MFIs is to collect money; they will use 
any means available” Personal interview, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad office, April 
27, 2009.
111. Personal interview with a prominent human rights activist at the Nijera Kori Office, April 
24, 2009.
112. One senior advocate at the Supreme Court and veteran politician, was especially 
emphatic, arguing that the mode of recovery adopted by the Grameen amounted to legal 
“molestation.” Personal interview, Sonar Bangla Hotel, Dhaka, April 3, 2009. Despite 
the fact that the functioning of the bank is authorized by the Grameen Bank Ordinance 
Act 1983, he argued that its operations were “unlawful.” He pointed out that under the 
Usurious Loans Act (1918), the Money Lenders Act (1933) and the Money Lenders Act 
(1940) two features emerged—the regulation of the quantum of interest and the modali-
ties of recovery—by which the Grameen ought to be bound. Under this body of law, the 
creditor has certain facilities for pursuing the debtor. For instance, the loan officer has the 
powers to act as a certificate officer and is allowed to make a determination, in writing, 
as to whether there was a failure to pay. Further, since 1940, if recovery was not elicited 
through written notice, this would be called “molestation.” Not only, he argues, does the 
Grameen Bank never issue written notice, but all the devices they use would, according 
to him, fall into the category of molestation.
113. A well-known Dhaka University professor emphasized that internal coercion can be very 
problematic as well:
 Since 90 percent of the time the person using the credit is the husband, and the per-
son repaying the loan is the wife, the women spend many sleepless nights. In fact, 
polygamy is re-emerging as a function of microfinance since the more wives a man 
has, the more credit he can access. This, combined with the fact that there are many 
different MFIs providing loans means that there is a lot of credit in circulation, leading 
to borrowers being caught in a debt-trap. This makes ensuring repayment even harder 
for the MFIs and leads to the further use of force, higher interest rates and so on. It 
also results in greater domestic violence and heightened social unrest.
 Telephone interview, May 2, 2009.
114. This factor was stressed by one extremely prominent long-time microfinance researcher 
in particular–attributing the problem of the use of coercion to the growing competition in 
the microfinance sector in Bangladesh and to what he calls “management failure”:
 The average loan size for an MFI is very small, Tk 5000–6000. Therefore there 
has not been much growth in the size of loans. The problem of “overlapping” is 
occurring because MFIs are being risk averse in not increasing the size of loans, 
and the current size of individual loans does not satisfy demand. As a result of 
“overlapping,” however, the “weakest lender” gets paid off last. This is the main 
inducement to use force. The increase in coercion is essentially a function of the 
fact that there are too many players. The smaller MFIs are the biggest problem 
 at COLUMBIA UNIV on December 12, 2016pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
496 Politics & Society 44(4) 
. . . There are bound to be some lapses, especially since credit officers are under 
pressure to both disburse and collect loans, as is necessary for MFIs to run. But in 
most cases, the use of coercion is a function of management failure. For instance, 
there are many instances of one group member taking loans from everyone else in 
the group. But a good manager would have formed the groups better. The manager 
is cheating and trying to make his life easier by allowing members with a greater 
credit absorption capacity into the group.
 More controversially, however, he appeared to imply that using coercion against bor-
rowers may sometimes be justified: “What people don’t understand is that there are 
crooks among the poor. It is these crooks that are punished.” He did add, however, 
that the use of force by bank workers is taken very seriously by BRAC, recounting a 
2008 incident involving a long-term defaulter who was physically abused by BRAC 
branch officers, loan collectors, and other group members. The legal aid branch of 
BRAC took legal action against BRAC, compensation was paid to the family, and the 
amount was deducted from the employee’s salary. Personal interview, BRAC Center, 
April 29, 2009.
115. Yunus put it as follows: “Even if we could use force in Bangladesh, could we do that 
in New York, or in the many other countries in which we operate? It is not true that our 
borrowers have no ‘voice.’ Even if they are not educated, their children are. Do you think 
that they would stay silent?” Personal interview, Grameen Bank headquarters, April 20, 
2009.
116. According to a senior associate at BRAC, the use of coercion is sporadic rather than a 
trend: “If pressure, extortion and intimidation were the norm, the whole scheme would 
have failed. To what extent can you intimidate, and how would the NGOs have achieved 
this?” He reiterated that without cooperation at a very high level, the scheme would not 
have worked, and that lapses are very much the exception or aberration to a scheme 
supported by a very high measure of consensus. He emphasized that maintaining disci-
pline is essential, training borrowers to understand, observe and enforce rules, but that 
some NGO workers may “miss the wood for the trees” and take things too literally. This, 
according to him, is the main source of the lapses. In addition, microfinance projects tend 
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